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Securitisation, wage stagnation and financial 
fragility: a stock-flow consistent perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Securitisation has been at the core of various academic analyses for the causes of the 
global financial crisis. Broadly speaking, securitisation is a technique that transforms 
illiquid assets into liquid tradable instruments. In its more widespread form, this 
technique allows banks to remove loans from the asset side of their balance sheets and 
distribute the associated risks to other financial units. Securitisation has, therefore, 
given rise to the so-called ‘originate-to-distribute’ model of banking in which the 
default risk on granted loans is disconnected from loan originators. By doing so it has 
played a prominent role in facilitating excessive lending and in supporting speculative 
financial activities in money manager capitalism, with adverse effects on the 
macroeconomy’s financial fragility (see Minsky, 2008; Kregel, 2008; Wray, 2009; 
Lavoie, 2012-3; Prates and Farhi, 2015). 
 
Wage stagnation has been viewed as another main root cause of the recent crisis 
(Palley, 2010; Lysandrou, 2011; Stockhammer, 2015; van Treeck and Sturn, 2012; 
Wisman, 2013). It has been argued that the decline in the wage income share in the 
pre-crisis period was conducive to the excessive rise in household debt, the 
deterioration of workers’ financial position, and the growing tendency of the 
economies toward financial speculation. Wage stagnation has also been regarded as a 
factor that put downward pressures on domestic demand, giving rise to unsustainable 
growth regimes. 
 
In this paper, we employ the stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach to 
macroeconomics1 to integrate into a coherent macro framework the complex 
mechanisms of securitisation and their interaction with functional income distribution. 
With the aid of simulations we study how a more widespread adoption of 
securitisation is likely to increase the financial fragility of an economy. We also 
examine the mechanisms through which wage stagnation can reinforce this tendency 
of securitisation to increase financial fragility. The simulation results of the paper 
provide support to the view that the combination of risky financial practices with 
wage stagnation can substantially increase the likelihood of financial instability in a 
macro system. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the potential adverse 
effects of securitisation and wage stagnation on financial fragility. Section 3 develops 
the stock-flow consistent model. Section 4 presents the simulation experiments. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Godley and Lavoie (2007).  
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2. Securitisation and wage stagnation: their interconnected role in 
the emergence of financial fragility 
 
The securitisation process begins when commercial banks (the originators) decide to 
securitise a part of their loans. There are various motives that may induce banks to do 
so. Among them are the need for liquidity, the minimisation of credit risk and the 
reduction of capital requirements (see e.g. Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010).2 The loans 
decided to be securitised are pooled together and are sold off to administrators. The 
administrators set up the special purpose vehicles (SPVs) which purchase the pooled 
loans in exchange of fee income.3 The SPVs issue asset-backed securities (ABSs) and 
distribute the cash inflows from loan repayment and interest to the holders of the 
ABSs. The ABSs are bought by institutional investors (typically with the aid of 
underwriters that receive fee income) and the proceeds are then used by the SPVs to 
purchase the loans from banks. Institutional investors finance their investment in 
ABSs either by repo transactions or shares that are bought by households. 
Remarkably, various credit enhancement techniques (e.g. excess spread, 
overcollateralisation, tranching etc.) are utilised to render ABSs attractive to 
institutional investors.4 The attractiveness of ABSs can also be enhanced by high 
grades from credit-rating agencies. 
 
The securitisation process can be a significant source of financial fragility. First, by 
allowing banks to remove loans from their balance sheets, securitisation disrupts the 
traditional loan assessment procedure: since banks do not bear the cost of a loan 
default, they are induced to provide loans without paying sufficient attention to the 
creditworthiness of their borrowers (see e.g. Kregel, 2008; Tymoigne, 2009A; 
Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010; Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; Lavoie, 2012-3). Excessive 
loan expansion is also enhanced by the reduction of capital requirements. The overall 
result can be the provision of loans to borrowers with weak economic status and 
prospects, rendering them financially fragile. 
 
Second, of particular importance is the fact that mortgages are among the main assets 
that tend to be securitised. This can enhance excessive investment in housing market, 
generating a virtuous cycle in which easy access to credit increases housing prices, 
higher housing prices improve the net worth of borrowers, and higher net worth 
encourages new borrowing, further boosting housing prices. Such a virtuous cycle can 
be conducive to the development of Ponzi financing schemes since many borrowers 
may rely on housing price appreciation in order to acquire new loans that are 
necessary for meeting their debt commitments (see Kregel, 2008; Wray, 2009; 
                                                 
2 Lysandrou (2011) has pointed out that securitisation can also be significantly prompted by the need of 
institutional investors to find new securities to invest the accumulated wealth of rich households. 
3 This paper focuses on the modern, more widespread, form of securitisation in which securitised loans 
are removed from the balance sheet of banks. In other forms of securitisation the securitised loans 
remain within the bank that originates the loans (see Lavoie, 2012-3). Furthermore, there are cases in 
which the securitisation is utilised for banks’ liabilities (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010). For a detailed 
description of the securitisation process analysed in the current paper see Gorton and Souleles (2007), 
Stein (2010) and Noeth and Sengupta (2011). See also Tymoigne (2009B) for the various complex forms 
of the securitisation procedure. 
4 Credit enhancement is a mechanism through which the holders of ABSs are protected from default and 
prepayment risk. For a presentation of the various credit enhancement techniques see Fabozzi and 
Kothari (2008, ch. 5). 
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Tymoigne, 2010).5 Ponzi financing schemes can easily collapse as a result of small 
unexpected shocks. In such a case a virtuous cycle is transformed into a vicious one, 
which can lead to a widespread loan default, with adverse effects on the stability of the 
financial system. 
 
Third, with the aim to promote investment in ABSs, credit-rating agencies may have a 
tendency to underestimate in their public assessments the risks associated with the 
holding of ABSs (see Minsky, 2008; Wray, 2009). Hence, although there is no credible 
market maker for securities like ABSs,6 the investors can be prompted by the credit-
rating agencies to act as if this were the case. This implies that the ABSs market can 
easily collapse when there is a widespread liquidation the ramifications of which 
cannot be countered by the credit enhancement techniques. This possibility is also 
reinforced by the short-term nature of the funding on which the ABSs market is 
usually based. In such a case, a sudden stop to loan expansion can occur, endangering 
the stability of the macroeconomic system. 
 
Under specific circumstances, wage stagnation can reinforce these destabilising forces 
created by the securitisation process. First, by reducing worker households’ income, 
wage stagnation can contribute to the deterioration of the financial position of 
workers that have acquired securitised loans. Such a deterioration can have important 
adverse effects on the ABSs market, since it makes higher the possibility of loan 
default. 
 
Second, in an economy in which there are changes in income distribution in favour of 
profit earners, workers may try to maintain their relative consumption standards by 
demanding more loans (see e.g. Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; Barba and Pivetti, 2009; 
Wisman, 2013). Since securitisation tends to decrease banks’ credit rationing, its 
coexistence with wage stagnation can lead to extensive credit expansion which, under 
certain conditions, can reduce the robustness of households’ financial structure. 
 
Third, the redistribution of income from workers to wealthy individuals may increase 
the propensity of the economy to speculate (Stockhammer, 2015). The rationale 
behind this argument is that wealthy individuals tend to use the income that is added 
to their wealth for speculation activities (see also Lysandrou, 2011). So long as the 
ABSs market is a market in which speculation activities are encouraged, wage 
stagnation is a factor that can contribute to the further development of this market; 
and, hence, of its destabilising forces. 
 
Fourth, in wage-led economies wage stagnation can place downward pressures on 
economic activity, with negative effects on household income and, thus, on household 
financial fragility. Moreover, in wage-led economies macroeconomic performance can 
become more dependent on credit availability. Thus, the detrimental macroeconomic 
                                                 
5 See also Gorton (2009) for the role of housing price appreciation in the refinancing of subprime 
mortgages. 
6 A credible market maker is an agent that has the capacity to buy a significant amount of securities 
whenever there is a cascade of sell orders, ensuring that the investors will invariably liquidate their assets 
without significant losses (see Davidson, 2008A). Remarkably, in the financial distress of 2007 the 
underwriters of ABSs tried without success to act as market makers, with significant negative effects on 
their solvency position (see Davidson, 2008B). 
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effects of a rise in securitisation, which is likely at a first stage to promote credit 
expansion, but gradually to create the conditions for a sharp credit restriction, may be 
much more important. 
 
3. The macroeconomic model 
 
The model developed in this section allows us to explore, within a coherent macro 
framework, the mechanisms through which securitisation and wage stagnation can 
jointly affect the financial fragility of the macroeconomy. To keep the analysis 
tractable and in line with the purposes of the paper, various simplifying assumptions 
in the formulation of the securitisation process have been adopted.  
 
First, the securitisation procedure is confined to home mortgages provided to 
workers. Home mortgages constitute the most prominent securitised asset class in 
both the US and the European economy (see Loutskina, 2011; ECB, 2011). 
Furthermore, the link between securitisation and home mortgage provision to workers 
was particularly intense in the pre-crisis period, especially in the US, and has greatly 
contributed to the sub-prime crisis.  
 
Second, commercial banks are both originators and administrators in the securitisation 
process. Thus, in the model they receive fee income from the SPVs when they sell off 
the securitised loans.  
 
Third, the SPVs and the underwriters are grouped into one single sector. The sector 
of SPVs-underwriters pays fee income to commercial banks, transforms securitised 
loans into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and distributes coupon and principal 
payments to institutional investors. It also receives income by investing in treasury 
bills. Importantly, the SPVs-underwriters are postulated to issue only single class pass-
through MBSs.7 In particular, the principal and the interest payments are ‘passed-
through’ to institutional investors with a part of interest being held to cover the fees 
provided to commercial banks and to create the excess spread, which is the only credit 
enhancement technique in the model (note that administration fees for the services of 
SPVs and underwriters have been assumed away). The excess spread is retained with 
the purpose to cover a predetermined rate of default on securitised loans. If the actual 
rate of default is higher than the guaranteed one, the excess losses are transferred to 
institutional investors.8 Lastly, note that the complications arising from prepayments 
are not part of the analysis in the model of this paper.   
 
Fourth, the investment in MBSs is exclusively financed in our model via shares which 
are purchased by investor households. Investor households in the model are basically 
wealthy agents that receive income from investment in various assets. They also 
receive the distributed profits of firms. Therefore, their income is positively affected, 
all other things being equal, by wage stagnation. This formulation allows us to 
concentrate on the link between wage stagnation and investment in MBSs.  
 
                                                 
7 For an analysis of the features of mortgage pass-through securities see Fabozzi (2000, ch. 11).  
8 An alternative assumption would be to postulate that the SPVs-underwriters cover all loan losses so 
long as their capital is positive. However, this would complicate the model without changing the 
substance of the underlying mechanism.  
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Nine sectors comprise our macroeconomy: worker households of type I, worker 
households of type II, firms, commercial banks, SPVs-underwriters, institutional 
investors, investor households, government and the central bank. Table 1 displays the 
balance sheet matrix of the model. Table 2 depicts the transactions matrix. The 
number of households in each household type is constant and all households in the 
model are postulated to be of the same size and composition. In worker households 
there is one member that participates in the labour force.   
 
Worker households of type I take out mortgages from commercial banks to partly 
finance the purchase of houses. A proportion of the housing loans are securitised and 
become a component of the asset side of the balance sheet of SPVs-underwriters. The 
later transform these loans into MBSs, which are acquired by institutional investors, 
who issue shares bought by investor households.9 Worker households of type II take 
out only consumer loans and dissave (as in Dutt, 2008). Except shares, investor 
households hold houses, firms’ equities, deposits, treasury bills and money.10 Firms 
build houses, invest in productive capital and produce goods. They pay wages to 
worker households and dividends to investor households. They issue equities and take 
out loans from commercial banks. Government finances its expenditures by issuing 
treasury bills, imposing income taxes and using the central bank’s profits. Central bank 
holds treasury bills on the asset side of its balance sheet and high-powered money and 
advances on the liability side.  
 
Below, we present the equations of the model for each sector of the economy. Note 
that inflation is assumed away and the price of output in the economy is set equal to 
unity. For simplicity, the expected values of endogenous variables are captured by 
their lagged values. Unless otherwise indicated, the parameters in the model are 
positive. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The institutional investors in the model refer basically to mutual and hedge funds. For a description of 
the features of institutional investors see Davis (2003). 
10 To avoid unnecessary complications, no housing transactions between worker and investor households 
are considered. Furthermore, we have assumed away any rental transaction. 
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Table 1. Balance sheet matrix 
 
Houses +p H H DW +p H HU +p H H DI +p H H
Productive capital +K F +K F
High-powered money +HPM B +HPM IH -HPM
Consumer loans -LC +LC
Housing loans -LH +LH NS +LH S
Firms' loans -LF +LF
Treasury bills +TB B +TB U +TB II +TB IH -TB +TB CB
MBSs -p M M +p M M
Deposits -D IH +D IH
Instit. investors' shares -SH +SH
Firms' equities -p e e +p e e
Advances -A +A
Total (net worth) +V W1 -LC +V F +K B +K U +K II +V I -TB 0 +K F +p H H
Firms Total
Worker 
households - 
type I
Investor 
households
Central 
bank
GovernmentCommercial 
banks
Institutional 
investors
SPVs-
underwriters
Worker 
households - 
type II
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Table 2. Transactions matrix 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Housing investment +ΔΗ -ΔΗ 0
Investment in prod. capital +ΔK F -ΔK F 0
Consumption -C W1 -C W2 +C W1 +C W2 +C IH -C IH 0
Government expenditures +GOV -GOV 0
Income taxes -T W1 -T W2 -T IH +T W1 +T W2 +T IH 0
Wages +W W1 +W W2 -W 0
Interest on consumer loans -i LC LC -1 +i LC LC -1 0
Interest on housing loans -i LH LH -1 +i LH LH NS-1 +i LH LH S-1 0
Interest on firms' loans -i LF LF -1 +i LF LF -1 0
Fees +FEE -FEE 0
Interest on treasury bills +i T TB B-1 +i T TB U-1 +i T TB II-1 +i T TB IH-1 -i T TB -1 +i T TB CB-1 0
Interest on deposits -i D D IH-1 +i D D IH-1 0
Interest on advances  -i A A -1 +i A A -1 0
SPVs-underwriters' profits -PU +PU U +COUPON 0
Instit. investors' profits -PI +PI U +PI D 0
Firms' profits -PF +PF U +PF D 0
Central bank's profits +PB CB -PB CB 0
Commercial banks' profits -PB B +PB BU +PB BD 0
Δdeposits +ΔD IH -ΔD IH 0
Δequities of firms +p eΔe -p eΔe 0
Δshares of instit. investors +ΔSH -ΔSH 0
Δadvances +ΔA -ΔA 0
Δhouses -p HΔHDW +p HΔH DW +p HΔHDI -p HΔHDI 0
Δloans for housing +ΔLH -ΔLHNS -ΔLH S 0
Δloans for consumption +ΔLC -ΔLC 0
Δloans to firms +ΔLF -ΔLF 0
ΔMBSs +p M ΔM -p M ΔM 0
Δtreasury bills -ΔTB B -ΔTB U -ΔTB II -ΔTB IH +ΔTB -ΔTB CB 0
Δhigh-powered money -ΔHPM B -ΔHPM IH +ΔHPM 0
Defaulted loans +DL -DL NS -DL SU -DL SII 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Worker households 
- type I
Investor 
households
Central 
bank
Government TotalFirms Commercial banks Institutional investorsSPVs-underwritersWorker households 
- type II
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3.1 Worker households-type I 
 
1111 WLHWW TLHiWYD    (1) 
111  LHiYDYD LHW
G
W
 (2) 
W
nn
n
WW
21
1
1

  (3) 
111211111   WWW VcYDcC  (4) 
HDWHW pHCG  1  (5) 
  11111 WWLHDWDDWD YDCLHreppHHNLH    (6) 
DLLHrepNLHLHLH L   11  (7) 
1 LHDL   (8) 
121110   HW kBUR   (9) 
 
G
W
LLH
W
YD
LHrepi
BUR
1
1
1
  (10) 
DLCGCYDVV HWWWWW   11111  (11) 
DWH
W
Hp
LH
LEV 1  (12) 
1
11
121111101 

 












 
 DW
H
H
WDW
D
DW H
p
p
hBURhhHH  (13) 
H
WW
DWDW
p
DLCLHYD
HH

 
11
1
 (14) 
 
Equation (1) defines the net disposable income of type I worker households  1WYD , 
which is given by the wages  1WW  minus the taxes  1WT  and the interest payments on 
housing loans; 
LHi  is the interest rate on housing loans and LH  is the amount of loans 
that worker households take out to invest in the housing market. Equation (2) 
specifies the gross disposable income of type I worker households  GWYD 1 . Equation 
(3) shows that the wage bill of type I worker households is a proportion   211 nnn   
of the total wage bill  W  paid by firms to worker households; 1n  and 2n  is the 
number of worker households of type I and of type II, respectively. It is assumed that 
the employment rate in the two types of households is the same. Equation (4) gives 
the consumption of type I worker households  1WC , which depends on their lagged 
net disposable income and wealth  1WV . The capital gains due to changes in the price 
of houses  HWCG  are defined in equation (5), where DWH  is the demand for houses 
from worker households of type I and 
Hp  is the price of houses.  
 
In the model there is a distinction between the desired amount of new loans and the 
actual amount of new loans. As will be explained below, the latter is a proportion of 
the former, since a part of the new loans demanded by worker households are not 
provided by banks due to credit rationing. The desired amount of new loans  DNLH  
is given by equation (6) as the sum of worker households’ desired investment in the 
9 
 
housing market and the repayment of outstanding loans, minus their saving; D
DWH  is 
the desired demand for houses and 
Lrep  is the loan repayment ratio. Note that the 
lagged price of houses is used by households as a proxy for the current level of prices 
in the procedure of estimating the amount of money that they need to borrow from 
banks to acquire their desired houses. 
 
The change in housing loans is depicted by equation (7) where NLH  stands for the 
actual amount of new housing loans. The model explicitly introduces the possibility of 
default on the part of type I worker households. The amount of defaulted loans  DL  
is defined in equation (8). The rate of default    is a positive function of the lagged 
burden of debt  1WBUR  of worker households and a negative function of the lagged 
degree of credit availability for housing loans  Hk  (see equation (9)). The burden of 
debt is defined, according to equation (10), as the ratio of the debt commitments of 
worker households to their gross disposable income.11 It is assumed that, when the 
burden of debt of this sector increases, there is a higher likelihood that more worker 
households (at the unit level) will face liquidity problems. Thus, at the aggregate level, 
a higher burden of debt translates into a higher rate of default. Furthermore, the 
liquidity problems are reinforced when the degree of credit availability by banks 
declines, that is when there is a rise in the proportion of new housing loans that is 
credit rationed (for the exact definition of the degree of credit availability see equation 
(51) below). A lower credit availability implies that more households cannot attain 
their desired liquidity. This is important because the liquidity created by new loans can 
be partially used for the repayment of existing debt. Accordingly, the higher the 
unwillingness of banks to satisfy the demand for new loans the higher the rate of 
default. 
 
Equation (11) shows worker households’ wealth. Defaulted loans exert a positive 
impact on their wealth.12 Equation (12) defines the leverage of worker households 
 1WLEV , expressed as the ratio of housing loans to the value of houses. In our model 
this variable plays a crucial role in the credit availability from commercial banks. 
Equation (13) shows worker households’ desired demand for houses. It is assumed 
that this demand relies negatively on the lagged households’ burden of debt and 
positively on the lagged growth rate of housing prices.13 Equation (14) defines the 
change in the demand for houses as the difference between the sum of the change of 
housing loans and the amount of defaulted loans minus saving, divided by the price of 
houses. The higher the housing loans the larger, ceteris paribus, the demand for houses. 
 
3.2 Worker households-type II 
 
2122 WLCWW TLCiWYD    (15) 
122  LCiYDYD LCW
G
W
 (16) 
                                                 
11 See also van Treeck (2009) and Dafermos (2012).  
12 For simplicity, we assume that there is no bankruptcy in the economy. See Charpe et al. (2011, ch. 9) 
for a SFC model in which both bankruptcy and default are explicitly considered. 
13 See Zezza (2008) for a similar formula and Andre (2010) for some empirical evidence regarding the 
main drivers of housing demand.  
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Equation (15) gives the net disposable income of type II worker households  2WYD , 
which is equal to wages  2WW  minus the sum of taxes  2WT  and the interest 
payments on consumer loans; 
LCi  is the interest rate on consumer loans  and LC  is 
the amount of consumer loans. Equation (16) defines the gross disposable income of 
type II worker households  GWYD 2 . Their wages are a proportion   212 nnn   of the 
total wage bill paid by firms. 
 
Equation (18) gives the consumption of type II worker households  2WC . These 
households consume all their net disposable income and take out consumer loans to 
finance part of their consumption expenditures. The amount of loans demanded by 
type II worker households for consumption purposes depends on their desired 
consumption. Following Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), Barba and Pivetti (2009) and 
Wisman (2013), it is assumed that these workers try to emulate the consumption of 
their reference group to maintain their relative social status. In our model, investor 
households constitute the reference group for type II worker households. Thus, 
according to equation (19), the average desired consumption of type II worker 
households  DWCA 2  is a proportion  1  of the average consumption of investor 
households;  IHC  is the aggregate consumption of investor households and 3n  is the 
number of investor households.14 The aggregate desired consumption of type II 
worker households  DWC 2  is defined in equation (20). Note that wage stagnation 
increases, ceteris paribus, the desired aggregate consumption of type II worker 
households, since it positively affects the income and the consumption of investor 
households.  
 
The desired amount of new loans  DNLC  is equal to the sum of the desired amount 
of consumption and the repayment of outstanding loans, minus the net disposable 
income of type II worker households (see equation (21)). The amount of consumer 
loans is given by equation (22), where NLC  is the actual amount of consumer loans. 
As in housing loans, the presence of credit rationing implies that the actual amount of 
new consumer loans is a fraction of the desired amount of new consumer loans. 
Notice that when the amount of amortised loans is higher than the amount of new 
                                                 
14 See Dutt (2008) for a similar formula. 
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loans, the change in loans is negative. In this case, consumption expenditures are 
lower than the net disposable income (see equation (18)). To avoid unnecessary 
complications, it is postulated that there is no default on consumer loans. The burden 
of debt of worker households-type II  2WBUR  is equal to the ratio of households’ 
debt commitments to their gross disposable income (see equation (23)).  
 
3.3 Firms 
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xINV
ee 11

   (33) 
epHpHpPFHINVLF eDIHDWHU   (34) 
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HDIDW  (35) 
DIDW HHHHU   (36) 
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
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Equation (24) shows that the output of the economy  Y  is equal to the sum of 
worker households’ consumption, investor households’ consumption, investment in 
productive capital  INV , investment in housing  H  and government expenditures 
 GOV .15 Equation (25) shows that investment in productive capital is affected by the 
lagged rate of capacity utilisation  u  and the lagged firms’ rate of undistributed profits 
 Fr . Capacity utilisation, firms’ rate of undistributed profits and productive capital 
 FK  are given in equations (26), (27) and (28) respectively; v  is the potential output to 
capital ratio. Equation (29) defines firms’ profits  PF . It has been postulated that 
firms take out loans  LF  and, hence, they pay interest income; LFi  is the interest on 
firms’ loans. Wages are determined as a fixed proportion of the lagged output 
                                                 
15 For simplicity, the price of new houses is assumed to be equal to the general price level (recall that the 
latter is equal to unity). However, the price of existing houses in the housing market is different and not 
associated with the general price level. See Zezza (2008) for a similar assumption.  
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produced (see equation (30)); 
Ws  is income share of wages. Firms keep a part  Fs  of 
their profits  UPF  while the rest profits  DPF  are distributed to investor households 
(see equations (31) and (32)). A proportion  x  of firms’ investment expenditures are 
financed by issuing equities (see equation (33)); e  is the number of firms’ equities and 
ep  is their price. Equation (34) suggests that firms’ loans act as a residual in the 
budget constraint of firms; 
DIH  is the demand for houses from investor households. 
 
The housing investment is positively affected by the ratio of demanded to existing 
houses as well as by the growth rate of housing prices (see equation (35)).16 Equation 
(36) defines the change in unsold houses  HU  as the difference between the change 
in existing and the change in demanded houses. The growth rate of the price of 
houses is positively linked with the difference between the growth rate of the 
demanded houses and the growth rate of the existing houses (see equation (37)).17  
 
3.4 Commercial banks 
 
 TMM yysss  110  (38) 
sLHLH S   (39) 
 LHsLH NS  1  (40) 
111111   AiDiFEETBiLFiLCiLHiPB AIHDBTLFLCNSLHB  (41) 
1xii ALH   (42) 
2xii ALC   (43) 
3xii ALF   (44) 
4xii AD   (45) 
NSBUBB DLPBKK  1  (46) 
1 NSNS LHDL   (47) 
1 BBBU PBsPB  (48) 
BUBBD PBPBPB   (49) 
D
HNLHkNLH   (50) 
  4113121110 HWHTHWHHH kBURkCARCARkLEVkkk    (51) 
D
CNLCkNLC   (52) 
  122110   WCTCCC BURkCARCARkkk  (53) 
LFLCLH
K
CAR
NS
B

  (54) 
IHBB DhHPM   (55) 
BNSIHBBN HPMLFLCLHDKTB   (56) 
IHBBNSN DKHPMLFLCLHA   (57) 
NAA  , iff 0NA ; otherwise 0A  (58) 
BNB TBTB  , iff 0BNTB ; otherwise 0BTB  (59) 
                                                 
16 For the role of housing price appreciation in the supply of houses see e.g. Andre (2010).  
17 This formulation relies on Eatwell et al. (2008). 
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Equation (38) defines the proportion  s  of loans that are securitised. The first term 
 0s  captures some exogenous factors related with the institutional structure in the 
economy and the regulation with regard to the financial activities. The second term 
reflects the fact that there is a target yield on MBSs and that the supply of MBSs 
partially adjusts to their demand so as for the actual yield to remain close to the target 
one.18 In particular, when the actual yield  My , which is inversely linked with the 
price of MBSs (see equation (79)), is lower (higher) than the target yield  TMy , the 
level of securitisation increases (decreases) and so does the supply of MBSs. This 
places downward (upward) pressures on the price of MBSs, increasing (decreasing) the 
actual yield. Equation (39) gives the amount of securitised loans, which are transferred 
to the balance sheet of SPVs-underwriters  SLH . Equation (40) shows the amount of 
non securitised loans, which are retained in the balance sheet of commercial banks 
 NSLH . 
 
The profits of commercial banks  BPB  are equal to the sum of the interest on non 
securitised loans, the interest on consumer loans, the interest on firms’ loans, the 
interest on treasury bills  BTB  and the administrative fees  FEE  due to securitised 
loans, minus the interest on deposits and the advances from the central bank )(A  (see 
equation (41)); 
Ti  is the interest on treasury bills, IHD  are the deposits of investor 
households and 
Di  is the interest on deposits. The interest rates on loans and deposits 
are set with reference to the interest rate of the central bank  Ai . Note that, for 
simplicity, 
4321 ,,, xxxx  are deemed exogenous. According to equation (46), the change 
in the capital of commercial banks  BK  equals their undistributed profits minus the 
amount of defaulted loans (see also Godley and Lavoie, 2007, ch. 11; Charpe et al. 
2011, ch. 9). The amount of defaulted loans )( NSDL  is a proportion    of NSLH  
(equation (47)). Equations (48) and (49) show that commercial banks retain a 
proportion )( Bs  of their profits )( BUPB  while the rest profits are distributed )( BDPB  
to the investor households who are the owners of the commercial banks (for a similar 
assumption see Godley and Lavoie, 2007, ch.11). 
 
Commercial banks apply credit rationing when they grant loans to worker households-
type I and to worker households-type II. This is captured in our model by making a 
distinction between the desired amount of new loans demanded by worker 
households and the effective amount of new loans; the latter represents the amount of 
new loans that are ultimately provided after imposing the credit rationing procedure. 
Equation (50) gives the effective amount of new housing loans as a proportion of the 
desired amount of new housing loans.19 The variable 
Hk  captures the degree of credit 
availability for housing loans  10  Hk . According to equation (51), this depends 
negatively on the lagged leverage ratio of worker households-type I, positively on the 
lagged actual capital adequacy ratio  CAR  of commercial banks relative to the target 
capital adequacy ratio  TCAR , and negatively on the burden of debt of worker 
                                                 
18 This mechanism draws on Lysandrou (2014).  
19 See Le Heron and Mouakil (2008) and Dafermos (2012) for similar formulations.  
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households of type I and the default rate. The target capital adequacy ratio is 
determined by the regulatory authority and the actual capital adequacy ratio is defined 
as the ratio of banks’ capital to the sum of non-securitised loans, consumer loans and 
firms’ loans (equation (54)).20 
 
Equation (52) defines the effective amount of consumer loans as a proportion  Ck  of 
the desired amount of consumer loans  10  Ck . According to equation (53), the 
degree of credit availability for consumer loans is a positive function of the difference 
between the lagged capital adequacy ratio and the target capital adequacy ratio and 
negatively on the burden of debt of type II worker households. Importantly, our 
formulation implies that the higher the proportion of securitised loans the higher, 
ceteris paribus, the actual capital adequacy ratio and the lower, thereby, the credit 
rationing. In this way, securitisation can be conducive to higher investment in housing 
market and larger consumption expenditures by type II worker households. 
 
Equation (55) shows that the commercial banks hold a proportion of deposits in the 
form of cash  BHPM , based on the reserve requirement ratio  Bh  determined by the 
central bank. Banks hold treasury bills when the sum of capital and deposits is higher 
than the sum of loans and cash. Otherwise, the commercial banks take advances from 
the central bank and hold no treasury bills. This fact is captured by equations (56)-
(59). 
 
3.5 SPVs-underwriters 
 
1 coupMCOUPON  (60) 
5xicoup LH   (61) 
1 SfeLHFEE  (62) 
FEECOUPONLHiES SLH  1  (63) 
FEETBiLHiPU UTSLH   11  (64) 
ESTBiPU UTU  1  (65) 
SUS DLLHMM  1  (66) 
1 SS LHDL   (67) 
SSU DLDL  , iff 
g  ; otherwise 1 S
g
SU LHDL   (68) 
MMpPUTBTB MUUU  1  (69) 
MSUUUU CGDLPUKK  1  (70) 
MM pMCG  1  (71) 
 
Equation (60) defines the coupon payment  COUPON  provided by SPVs-
underwriters to institutional investors; M  is the amount of MBSs. The coupon rate 
 coup  is defined according to the interest rate on housing loans minus a specific 
spread  5x , which is deemed to be high enough to cover the guaranteed loan losses 
and the administrative fees (equation (61)). Equation (62) determines the amount of 
                                                 
20 Following Godley and Lavoie (2007, ch. 11), housing and consumption loans are assigned a 100% risky 
weight, while cash and treasury bills are assumed to carry a 0% weight.  
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administrative fees that the SPVs-underwriters provide to the commercial banks. 
Administrative fees are a proportion  fe  of the loans that are securitised. The excess 
spread  ES  is determined by subtracting administrative fees and coupon payments 
from interest payments (see equation (63)). Equation (64) gives the total profits of 
SPVs-underwriters  PU  and equation (65) defines the profits that are retained 
 UPU ; UTB  denotes the amount of treasury bills held by SPVs-underwriters.  
 
Equation (66) indicates that the change in the amount of MBSs equals the change in 
securitised loans plus the amount of defaulted securitised loans  SUDL  that are 
covered by SPVs-underwriters. Two points are in order. First, it is postulated that the 
commercial banks sell mortgage loans to the SPVs-underwriters at a price equal to $1 
while the face value of an MBS is also $1. However, the SPVs-underwriters may sell 
the mortgages at price different than $1 (this is the price of the MBSs, 
Mp , which can 
only accidentally be equal to 1). Second, equations (67)-(68) suggest that the principal 
repayments are distributed to institutional investors without being affected by defaults 
on securitised loans  SDL  in so far as the latter are lower than those guaranteed by 
the SPVs-underwriters. If 
SUS DLDL   the principal repayments to MBSs holders 
decline by   1 Sg LH ; g  is the guaranteed rate of default by SPVs-underwriters.21 
Note that in this case there is also a reduction in the coupon payments. 
 
Equation (69) indicates that treasury bills act as a residual in the portfolio choice of 
SPVs-underwriters. The change in the capital of SPVs-underwriters  UK  is defined in 
equation (70). Equation (71) specifies the capital gains on MBSs  MCG . 
 
3.6 Institutional investors 
 
1 IITTBiCOUPONPI  (72) 
1 PIsPI IU  (73) 
UD PIPIPI   (74) 
SIIMUIIII DLCGPIKK  1  (75) 
  1 SgSII LHDL  , iff g  ; otherwise 0SIIDL  (76) 
  111211110   SHKirMp IITMM   (77) 
  112212120   SHKirTB IITMII   (78a) 
MpSHKTB MIIII   (78) 
11 

Mp
COUPON
y
M
M
 (79) 
11 

Mp
CG
yr
M
M
MM
 (80) 
 
The institutional investors get revenues from holding MBSs and treasury bills. Their 
profits  PI  are given by equation (72); IITB  is the amount of treasury bills held by 
                                                 
21 This can be shown by combining equations (7), (39), (66), (67) and (68), which yields: 
  11   SgSL LHLHrepsNLHM  . 
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institutional investors. A small part of their profits are retained  UPI ; Is  denotes the 
retention ratio (see equation (73)). The rest profits  DPI  are distributed to investor 
households who hold the shares issued by institutional investors (equation (74)). The 
shares bought by investor households constitute the main source of fund of 
institutional investors’ investments. For simplicity, it is assumed that the shares issued 
by institutional investors have a stable price equal to $1 per share.22 
 
Equation (75) defines the change in the capital of institutional investors  IIK ; SIIDL  
denotes the amount of defaulted loans that are not guaranteed by SPVs-institutional 
investors (see equation (76)). The portfolio choice of institutional investors is captured 
by equations (77) and (78a). In our formulation, Godley’s (1999) imperfect asset 
substitutability framework has been adopted. Therefore, the expected gross wealth of 
institutional investors (which is equal to 
11   SHK II ) is allocated between treasury 
bills and MBS according to the respective rates of return; SH  are the shares of 
institutional investors.23 Note that equation (78a) is replaced in the computer model 
by equation (78), with treasury bills acting as a buffer. The yield on MBSs is given by 
the ratio of the coupon payments to the lagged value of MBSs (equation (79)). The 
total rate of return on MBSs  Mr , defined in equation (80), consists of two 
components: the yield and the capital gain on MBSs. 
 
3.7 Investor households 
 
BDDDIHDIHTI PBPFPIDiTBiYT   11  (81) 
IHII TYTYD   (82) 
HIeIHIII CGCGCYDVV  1  (83) 
IHIIN HPMVV   (84) 
IHIIH ChHPM   (85) 
132131   IIIH VcYDcC  (86) 
ee peCG  1  (87) 
HDIHI pHCG  1  (88) 
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1 



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V
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irrir
V
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  (92) 
                                                 
22 Unlike our abstraction, in practice the price of institutional investors’ shares can be different than unity 
due to significant changes in institutional investors’ net asset value or due to adverse expectations on the 
part of borrowers regarding the safety of their investment (see e.g. Macey, 2011; Duygan-Bump et al., 
2013). However, in normal times this price is close to unity. 
23 The parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and symmetry adding-
up conditions. Thus, some of them are negative. 
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DIHeIHINIH HpepTBSHVD   (93) 
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Equation (81) defines the before taxes income of investor households  IYT . The 
disposable income of investor households  IYD  is given by equation (82). Note that 
IHTB  denotes the treasury bills held by investor households and IHT  stands for their 
income taxes. Equations (83) and (84) describe, respectively, the wealth of investor 
households  IV  and their wealth net of cash  INV . The high-powered money 
 IHHPM  is, according to equation (85) a proportion  Ih  of their consumption. 
Equation (86) gives the consumption of investor households, which depends on their 
expected disposable income and expected wealth. Equations (87) and (88) define, 
respectively, the capital gains on firms’ equity  eCG  and houses  HICG . 
 
Investor households allocate their expected wealth (net of cash) between deposits, 
treasury bills, houses, firms’ equities and institutional investors’ equities. As in the 
portfolio choice of institutional investors, Godley’s (1999) imperfect asset 
substitutability framework is adopted (see equations (89-93a)).24 Note that equation 
(93a) is replaced in the computer model by equation (93), with deposits acting as a 
buffer. Equations (94), (95) and (96) define, respectively, the rate of return on 
institutional investors’ equity  Sr , the rate of return on firms’ equity  er  and the rate 
of return on houses  Hr . 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, two points are worth highlighting. First, a decline in 
the distributed profits of institutional investors (e.g. due to excessive mortgage 
defaults) reduces investor households’ willingness to invest in institutional investors’ 
shares with adverse effects on the MBSs market. Second, a fall in the wage income 
share exerts, ceteris paribus, a positive impact on the income of investor households and 
thereby on their wealth. Hence, since a proportion of investor households’ wealth is 
held in the form of institutional investors’ equities, wage stagnation can enhance 
investment in MBSs, bolstering mortgage securitisation. 
 
3.8 Government 
 
CBTIHWW PBTBiTTTGOVTBTB   1211  (97) 
 gGOVGOV   11  (98) 
                                                 
24 Again the parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and symmetry 
adding-up constraints.  
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111  WWW WT   (99) 
122  WWW WT   (100) 
1 IIHIH YTT   (101) 
AT ii   (102) 
 
Equation (97) gives the amount of treasury bills issued by the government  TB . As 
equation (98) shows, the government expenditures grow at a constant rate  g . 
Equations (99)-(101) define income taxes. Equation (102) states that the interest rate 
on treasury bills equals the interest rate of the central bank. The latter is set 
exogenously.  
 
3.9 Central bank 
 
11   AiTBiPB ACBTCB  (103) 
BIH HPMHPMHPM   (104) 
AHPMTBCB   (105) 
UIIBIHCB TBTBTBTBTBTB   (106) 
 
Equation (103) describes the profits of the central bank  CBPB . The high-powered 
money provided by the central bank  HPM  is depicted by equation (104). Equation 
(105) gives the amount of treasury bills held by the central bank  CBTB . The 
redundant equation of the model (equation (106)) indicates that the central bank is the 
residual purchaser of treasury bills.  
 
4. Simulation experiments 
 
The complexity of the model presented in section 3 precludes analytical solutions. 
Hence, the model was solved numerically using reasonable values for its parameters. 
Steady-state solutions were then found that served as a basis for our simulation 
experiments in which exogenous shocks were imposed on the model.25 
 
The first experiment simulates the effects of some exogenous developments that 
increase the degree of securitisation in the economy. In particular, we consider a rise 
in the exogenous component that determines the proportion of mortgages securitised 
by banks (
0s ). This rise is postulated to stem from changes in the institutional 
structure of the banking sector that prompt banks to engage more intensively in 
securitisation activities. An additional development is the reallocation of investor 
households’ wealth from bank deposits to institutional investors’ shares (i.e. 
10  
increases). This reallocation reflects investor households’ willingness to increase the 
yield of their portfolio taking advantage of the higher return provided by institutional 
                                                 
25 Note that the methodology used here (and is widely adopted in the related literature) has the drawback 
that it explores the behaviour of the model only close to specific plausible steady states. Therefore, the 
behaviour of the model around other possible steady states is not analysed. This is the cost of developing 
a model that is complex enough to capture the joint macroeconomic effects of securitisation and wage 
stagnation. It should, however, be pointed out that an advantage of the employed methodology is that it 
isolates the effects that stem from the exogenous changes under investigation.   
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investors. It may also be prompted by a more favourable evaluation of the quality of 
MBSs by the credit rating agencies. Note that the reallocation enhances the demand 
for MBSs, putting downward pressures on their yield. This, in turn, increases the 
proportion of the mortgages that are securitised. 
 
Figure 1 shows the main effects of these shocks.26 The increase in the proportion of 
mortgages that are securitised provokes a rise in the capital adequacy ratio of 
commercial banks, inducing them to decrease their credit rationing (Figure 1a). 
Accordingly, the amount of new mortgages and consumer loans goes up. The rise in 
mortgages causes an increase in the demand for houses from worker households of 
type I that leads to: (i) a housing price appreciation (Figure 1b) that has feedback 
enhancing effects on credit availability since it tends to reduce the leverage of 
households;27 and (ii) an increase in the supply of houses. The rise in consumer loans 
boosts consumer spending. As one would expect, these developments increase the 
output of the economy (Figure 1d). Remarkably, the output is also positively affected 
by the rise in the consumption of investor households, as a result of the income and 
wealth effects that stem from the expansion of the MBSs market: Figure 1b indicates 
that there is a rise in the price of MBSs after a passing initial decline. 
 
Additionally, credit expansion increases the debt commitments of worker households. 
The result is a gradual rise in the burden of debt of worker households, which is more 
important in the case of type I households. This increase tends to make higher the rate 
of default. However, the significant rise in credit availability overpowers the adverse 
effects of the higher burden of debt, leading to a lower rate of default in the first 
periods after the shocks (see Figure 1d).  
 
Overall, in the first periods the economy experiences an economic, housing and 
financial boom that coexists with a rise in the burden of debt of households and a fall 
in the rate of default. It is also noteworthy that higher credit provision and increasing 
housing and MBSs prices reinforce the one the other. Following Tymoigne’s (2010, 
2011) conceptualisation of financial fragility, it can be argued that these developments 
correspond to an economy characterised by increasing financial fragility. 
 
This growing financial fragility has long-run adverse effects. The gradual increase in 
the burden of debt of type I workers households, in conjunction with the loan 
expansion that places downward pressures on the capital adequacy ratio, reduces 
banks’ credit availability and increases the rate of default on mortgages (see Figures 1a 
and 1d). Moreover, the higher burden of debt negatively affects worker households’ 
demand for houses leading to a decline in the price of houses (Figure 1b). Hence, 
housing investment and consumption start dropping, reducing the level of output in 
the economy. Importantly, this reduction in the output has detrimental feedback 
effects on households’ burden of debt, further reducing credit availability and further 
increasing the rate of default (see Figures 1a and 1d). The increasing rate of default has 
                                                 
26 In Figure 1 (and in Figure 2 below) the series are expressed as a ratio of their values in the steady-state 
baseline solution. 
27 Note that, as indicated in Figure 1c, the leverage ratio of type I households increases relative to the 
baseline solution. The reason is that in our simulations the increase in loans outweighs the rise in the 
value of houses, making the leverage ratio higher. However, without the increase in the price of houses 
the leverage ratio would be higher. 
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adverse effects on the MBSs market since the capital of institutional investors 
declines, putting downward pressures on the price of MBSs. This tends to increase the 
yield on MBSs and, therefore, the proportion of mortgages that are securitised 
declines, further slowing down credit expansion. As a result of these developments, 
output ends up lower than its baseline solution. Overall, after a period of economic 
and financial prosperity, the initial rise in the degree of securitisation brings eventually 
the economy into a period of financial instability, which is characterised by a lower 
output, a higher rate of loan defaults, a declining price of MBSs and a volatility in the 
price of houses. 
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Fig. 1. Effects of an increase in the degree of securitisation 
 
(a)  
 
 
(c)  
 
 
 
 
(b)  
 
 
(d)  
 
 
 
 
The second simulation experiment is identical to the first one with the only difference 
being that the rise in the degree of securitisation is accompanied by a decline in the 
wage income share (
Ws ). Figure 2 presents the results. Initially, the economy 
experiences a passing decline in the level of economic activity (Figure 2d). This decline 
is basically due to the adverse impact of the wage shock on consumption. In our 
simulations this adverse impact outweighs the favourable effects on the profits of 
firms that push upwards the investment in productive capital and the consumption of 
investor households. In other words, with our choice of parameters, aggregate 
demand is wage-led.   
 
However, after the initial reduction the economy experiences a borrowing-induced 
expansion as in the first simulation. There are, though, various noteworthy 
differences. To begin with, the decline in the wage income share induces type II 
worker households to demand more loans to attain their consumption norms. This 
generates a more vigorous rise in their debt commitments, compared with the first 
simulation. In conjunction with the direct negative effect of the wage shock on 
households’ gross disposable income, this higher increase in debt commitments leads 
to a more rapid rise in their burden of debt (Figure 2c). At the same time, worker 
households of type I also experience a higher rise in their burden of debt, due to the 
adverse effect of the wage shock on their gross disposable income. This more rapid 
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rise in the burden of debt of households is the main driving force behind the lower 
price increase in houses (see Figure 1b) and the lower duration of the economic boom 
in the second simulation, in comparison with the first simulation (see Figure 2d). The 
shorter economic boom is also explained by the lower initial rise in the proportion of 
mortgages that are securitised. Notice that wage stagnation affects favourably the 
income of investor households and, thus, their wealth. As a consequence, it provides 
an additional boost in the shares of institutional investors and, hence, in the demand 
for MBSs. This higher demand for MBSs ultimately leads to a higher degree of 
securitisation.  
 
Another important implication of the wage shock is that the negative longer-run 
effects of the initial credit expansion on the macroeconomy are more intense. The 
higher debt expansion in the initial periods combined with the direct detrimental 
effects of wage stagnation on worker households’ consumption leads eventually to a 
lower level of output and a higher rate of default compared to the first simulation 
(Figure 2d). Moreover, the leverage and the burden of debt of households of type II 
keep rising in the long run (in the first experiment there was a decline after the initial 
periods) and the degree of credit availability for consumer loans becomes lower than 
in the baseline solution.28 Consequently, it can be overall argued that wage stagnation 
reinforces in our model the long-run adverse effects of securitisation on 
macroeconomic stability. 
                                                 
28 Interestingly, the degree of credit availability for housing loans remains higher than in the baseline 
solution. The reason for this is that the wage shock reduces the loans of firms placing upward pressures 
on the capital adequacy ratio. The firm loans decline because the wage shock affects positively the 
internal funds of firms and negatively the desired investment (due to the wage-led structure of aggregate 
demand).   
 23 
 
Fig. 2. Effects of an increase in the degree of securitisation combined with a decline in the wage 
income share 
 
(a)  
 
 
(c)  
 
 
 
(b)  
 
 
(d)  
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper explored the macroeconomic effects of securitisation and wage stagnation 
within a SFC model, paying particular attention to their role in the emergence of 
financial fragility. The simulation experiments indicated that a rise in securitisation 
practices is likely to bring about, at a first stage, a borrowing-induced expansion, a 
housing boom, an appreciation in MBSs prices and a decline in the rate of default. 
However, this prosperity is accompanied by a rise in the burdens of debt of 
households, indicating a situation of increasing financial fragility. The rising burdens 
of debt gradually set the stage for the reversal of the initial expansionary effects of 
securitisation. Ultimately, the economy experiences a lower level of output, a higher 
rate of default on mortgages, a declining price of MBSs and a volatility in the price of 
houses. 
 
When the securitisation shock is accompanied by an exogenous decline in the wage 
income share the period of prosperity is shorter, basically because the burden of debt 
of households increases much more rapidly. Furthermore, the long-run adverse effects 
on macroeconomic performance are enhanced. Overall, these results provide support 
to the view that the combination of risky financial practices and wage stagnation can 
increase the likelihood of instability in a macro system.  
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